Since the start of political changes in Serbia and the sluggish but undeniable progress towards gradual democratization of society, the media in Serbia can be considered to be generally free, often disoriented with regard to major events, occasionally servile towards the authorities and individuals, and for the time being generally neutral with regard to the current conflict between the two strongest political parties. Comparison with the time of Milosevic’s dictatorship is almost entirely impossible, but such an indicator is unreliable when one bears in mind that in those dark 10 years it was customary for the police to go into a newsroom and ban its work. Pressure exerted by incumbent authorities is more subtle, their methods are more tacit, and still this pressure has not resulted in controlled media in the service of only state propaganda. Despite this, many expectations awoken after October 5, 2000 have been betrayed to a certain degree.

There is no doubt that what characterizes in the clearest way the state of the media sphere in Serbia this year and last year is the fact that the authorities have conspicuously avoided conducting any clear media policy and that the media and the public have been tolerating status quo.

The legal framework for the media has not changed since the day that political changes occurred. The new authorities prevented the application of the monstrous law on public information, which had been used by the former regime to settle accounts with the media, and then they abolished it. The ministry of information was also abolished and soon after a moratorium was introduced on the issuance of new frequency licenses, but everything ended there. New laws were not passed in the meantime, old laws on communication systems and broadcasting were not modified, and no analysis has been started on the operation of para-state and quasi-private media outlets which had become enormously rich during the dictatorship. The fact that the marketing move of abolishing the ministry of information contributed to a large degree to the building of a democratic image for the new Serbian authorities has been almost entirely annulled by the fact that today there are no government members who have a particular obligation of dealing with the media transition process or focusing on new or old problems faced by independent media and launching initiatives to solve them. Furthermore, the fate of the first important steps towards establishing fundamental order in the media sphere undertaken by independent media institutions, expert teams and individuals – draft law on broadcasting and draft law on public information – is totally uncertain, and the two completed and relevant legal texts are doomed to continue waiting.

This chaotic situation provides a lot of room for various forms of media pressure and manipulation and for occupying starting positions for a division of media influences. The wide range of independent media, primarily broadcasters, which had carried a huge burden in the fight against the Milosevic regime, have today found themselves in a subordinate position with respect to state-run or quasi-private media outlets which have incomparably more favorable starting positions in the unequal media match. An illustrative example is the Belgrade-based radio and TV station B 92, whose independent and professional work over many years had given it a high reputation even beyond Serbia’s borders. This station is operating in a very limited territory, which ends in the near periphery of Belgrade, without an opportunity to expand its signal because a legal framework does not exist for it. At the same time, ‘private’ TV stations such as Pink or BKTV, which had been engaged in Milosevic’s propaganda machine for years, continue to work unhindered, covering all of Serbia with their signal. Of course, it is easy to conclude that the vast majority of large local and foreign companies will choose to air their commercials on stations that can be seen further and better, regardless of the quality and popularity of B 92’s program. Indirect, but dangerous and constant pressure is exerted in this way on this independent station, exhausting it financially and facing it with a very uncertain future.

The authorities’ endless foot-dragging in starting the transformation of RTS comes from a similar arsenal. Former regime-mongers and warmongers have been removed from this state-owned radio and television house and the programming produced by the new editors offers correct information and more or less professional programs. Still, RTS is not a public media service in the same sense as in developed countries and RTS’s financing relies exclusively on the state budget, which leaves room for potential pressure and intervention. The national broadcaster operated without an officially appointed management for a full seven months, which is how long it took to appoint a new Management Board. Two more months passed before a new director was appointed. In July 2001 Milorad Petrovic, editor of RTS’s primetime news program Dnevnik 2, resigned from the position explaining the move by great political pressure exerted by certain ruling political parties which was leading towards instrumentalization of national television. A vacancy for RTS’s news program editor in chief, announced in July 2001, was annulled as the director general had not proposed any of the candidates who applied. Gordana Susa, president of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia, had applied and, when the vacancy notice was revoked, she said she had information that she was not selected because the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica had been against it.

These stands of two prominent journalists give rise, at the very least, to serious concerns and suspicion in the sincerity of the new Yugoslav authorities with regard to the transformation of state-run media into a public service. In addition, the new RTS management, appointed by the formally non-partisan management board, does not always give the impression that this house is approaching transformation into a public service. In mid-November 2001, Petar Jovanovic, new director of RTV Novi Sad, despite an existing agreement on broadcasting independent production ‘urbaNS,’ took the program off the air, explaining the move by the impossibility of examining the content and influencing the production house’s editorial policy.

Independent journalists and editors of independent media have been interrogated by the police on several occasions and asked to reveal the sources of published information. Namely, neither Serbian nor federal laws contain regulations that give journalists the right not to reveal the sources of their information. The new authorities also used this fact, and on August 8, 2001 the editor in chief of the newspaper ‘Blic,’ Veselin Simonovic, and a journalist of the same newspaper, Dusko Vukajlovic, were interrogated regarding their sources of information. In November the same year, the editor of the weekly ‘Reporter,’ Vladimir Radmanovic, the journalist Jovica Krtinic and again the ‘Blic’ editor in chief, were also interrogated. They were all questioned about a list with the names of more than 360 former and incumbent police officers, allegedly potential suspects before the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, which was published by ‘Reporter’ and carried by ‘Blic.’

Lack of any specific media laws has enabled another anomaly which has very concrete consequences: journalists and media are liable under the Penal Code for what they publish. As a result of this, the editor of the weekly NIN, Stevan Niksic, was recently convicted to a suspended sentence of five months in jail following a suit by a private person who claimed that his father had been defamed in an article. This is very similar to Milosevic’s infamous Law on Public Information which had been used to pronounced summary draconian fines.

Finally, along with all the other inherited problems, journalists in Serbia have lately again started to fear for their lives. Along with the murder of Slavko Curuvija during NATO bombing, another journalist was killed in Serbia: on June 11, 2001 a ‘Vecernje Novosti’ correspondent, Milan Pantic, a journalist who was investigating crime and corruption in his community, was killed in Jagodina. Pantic had received a number of anonymous threatening calls just before he died. The murder of Pantic, like the murder of Slavko Curuvija, has remained unresolved to this day.

Despite many examples that can testify to the authorities’ pressure and direct interference in the editorial policies of broadcasters and print media, it is difficult to say that any media outlet is inclined towards a certain political party or figure. The latest mutual disqualification inside the ruling DOS and the current quarrel between the Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia are covered in the media in a normal way, by conveying statements and mutual accusations, but without visible bias or inclination towards any party. Furthermore, latest media monitoring projects from January 2002 show that the presentation of politicians and parties has moved from a neutral context to a negative one, without much difference among them. For example, in the broadcast media in the mentioned period, DSS had 0.23 negative points, Montenegrin Government had 0.22, incumbent Serbian police minister had 0.20 (the same as Slobodan Milosevic), while DOS was ‘less negative’ with only 0.19 points.

Of course, the above data, as well as the evident impression that almost everything that happens can be read, seen and heard in the Serbian media, cannot be enough to conclude that the local media are free and professional. There are still many problems, and the rate at which they are being solved is unacceptably slow and inefficient. One must, however, say that any comparison with the time of Slobodan Milosevic’s dictatorship is absolutely impossible.

The reason for this is divided at least into two parts. The media in Serbia, after a long time, have started to do their primary task of providing information, although each with more or less success. On the other hand, it is entirely impossible to compare pro-regime bulletins from the time of dictatorship, which hardly could be called media, with what the terms newspaper, radio and television stand for in the normal world.

Vladan Radosavljevic is an editor at the Media Center in Belgrade (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Translation by: K.H. ©Media Online 2001. All rights reserved.